tification legitimates one's moral sensibilities with the illusion of virtue. Under the guise of bad conscience, humans found their altruistic ideals. Guilt enables the possibility of one's "soul" and verifies one's "interiorization." But more significantly, there is something about the institution of bad conscience that makes it irreversible, installed once and for all. It makes a decisive adjudication about how one can carry oneself-that is, with moral rectitude. It is as if once bad conscience is acquired, one can only operate in a fundamentally split consciousness of oneself-a profound sense of guilt that can only increase rather than allow for restitution. If this "profound transformation" is indeed experienced "once and for all," one would need to ask whether this subjectification is complete even though it is irreversible. In other words, what is the subject transformed into? Does the desire to be subject exceed any particular subjectification?
Persecuting himself, man is at once the "prisoner" and "inventor" of bad conscience. But this self-imprisonment is also to be understood as an indebtedness. For Nietzsche, the "burden of outstanding debt and the desire to make final restitution" (223) have transposed guilt into piety in humans' attempt to comfort themselves. What this indebtedness implies is that the "final restitution" always remains as something yet to come, still outstanding. The desire for this finality or judgment becomes, in actuality, a desire sustained by its very impossibility, its infinite deferral. Nietzsche raises the question, "could they ever be fully repaid? An anxious doubt remain[s] and [grows] steadily. .." (223). It is as if there must necessarily be some guilt still outstanding, some impossible restitution toward which one can still feel a conscience, reminded again and again by an anxious doubt. Bad conscience, it appears, continually projects itself as something still outstanding. The anxiety to make this always-future payment fixes for itself an impossibility that forces one back into one's indebted existence. However, there is still and always good faith in the possibility of making oneself good again. How can we account for this ceaseless good-will, this perpetual giving-over-to? How can we articulate this possibility of redeeming or reaffirming oneself as enabled by a profound indebtedness, a negativity in one's being that itself can never be recovered? Is this promise organized around and by the very void of being? What economy is at work in "man's will to find himself guilty, and unredeemably so"? (226) Nietzsche's answer would be a rigorous critique of the sham of virtue and guilt. How convenient, he might say, for us to invent guilt as though we were "not a goal but a way, an interlude, a bridge, a great promise" (219). Rather than taking themselves as ends, humans became the justifiers for the infinite deferment of the satisfaction to their own instincts. They SubStance #85, 1998
Dasein's concession to death lies in its understanding of the absolute impossibility of death to be comprehended as one's own-that is, as that which can be claimed or mastered by representation. When Heidegger says "one's ownmost," he at the same time gives that "one" over to what it claims as its own. Dasein, thinking that it has death in its grasp, in its comprehension-because it has domesticated death in its participation in the rituals commemorating others' deaths-is at once claimed by death itself, by the death toward which Dasein nears and approaches in its destiny. Death does not belong to Dasein; Dasein belongs to Death as the limit of its experience. Nonetheless, we are speaking of a belonging that is "non-relational." Belonging to death is one's own belongingness as well as belonging to the other, death. "Belonging" is not taking for oneself, in the sense of proprietizing, but a mutual giving that clears the way for one another's emergence. As such, it is non-relational, because to even relate would be to deprive the other of what he/she/it has to offer, and to substitute, for the other's unique openness, one's own presence. Being. Dasein flees in anxiety; even in the mundane everydayness that tranquilizes Dasein with ceaseless chatter and easy comfort, it is haunted by that from which it flees. Dasein feels its ownmost possibility elsewhere, outside and carrying itself towards its possibility. Death is lost in chatter, only to be preserved, in its impending presence, in the meaningless chatter that continues to take it as its theme:
One says, "Death certainly comes, but not right away." With this "but... ," the "they" denies that death is certain. "Not right away" is not a purely negative assertion, but a way in which the "they" interprets itself. With this interpretation, the "they" refers itself to that which is proximally accessible to Dasein and amenable to its concern. Everydayness forces its way into the urgency of concern, and divests itself of the fetters of a weary "inactive thinking about death." Death is deferred to "sometime later," and this is done by invoking the so-called "general opinion." Thus the "they" covers SubStance #85, 1998 up what is peculiar in death's certainty-that it is possible at any moment. Along with the certainty of death goes the indefiniteness of its "when." (302) One says, "not now but later," thereby bringing death under rein by interpreting it temporally as some later occurrence safely if only temporarily distanced from oneself.1 This attempt to fix death at a particular point in time and the anxiety with which the "they" comfort one another through incessant interpretations of death (and thus of themselves) only betray the presence of death as that which continually haunts and preoccupies Dasein's concern. The fact that Dasein has concern for death lets death, as an issue for Dasein, pervade Dasein's very being. Death, indeed, is possible at any moment, even though the "they" and the Dasein who is lost in the "they" conceal its distinctive impending, its certainty. Even in the attempt to cover up death as Dasein's ownmost possibility, the "they" cannot help but invoke, alongside their denial, the inevitability of death. The "they" suspend and defer the certainty of death only to be obsessed with its imminence, the certainty of its arrival. In the attempt to extricate themselves from death and seek tranquillity in the familiar everydayness, the "they" only come to commit, more than ever, to the possibility of death. In deferring, the "they" only temporalize themselves according to death. The question of encountering death becomes ever more foreboding in its deferral. Dasein understands and is constantly coming to terms with death, though it does so in a "fugitive" manner. Dasein escapes only to find that fleeing already within the giving and allowance of Being. Dasein flees from only to go towards. Death remains Dasein's ownmost possibility, because it cannot be precipitated, only anticipated. Dasein's predicament is its sufferance of this anxious uncertainty. Dasein waits.
"Anticipation discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility lies in giving itself up, and thus it shatters all one's tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached" (308). In being-towards-death, Dasein faces its ownmost possibility for Being. Dasein concedes to its own shattering, only to find a more originary mode of being-being towards that which is impossible but destined. In giving itself over to the possibility of deaththe impossibility of comprehending the limit it constitutes for the being Dasein has known-Dasein risks its own shattering, its own disappearance as a coherent subject.2 In this shattering, however, Dasein gives itself as a gift, inviting in turn the opening up of Being in its giving-freedom: Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death-a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the 
Dasein and the Voice of Conscience
Dasein gives, but in this giving, it also shows that it belongs. We need to give further consideration to this giving that both claims and relinquishes. But first we need to give thought to what testifies to Dasein's capacity for such a claim.
Because Dasein is lost in the "they," it must first find itself. In order to find itself at all, it must be "shown" to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its possibility, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested. (313) Before Dasein can give itself, it needs to authenticate itself from the "theyness." Dasein needs to define and individuate its own possibility as distinctively proper to itself. For this to happen, Dasein must be somehow reflected to itself in its possible authenticity. Dasein must be "shown" to itself, attested to and validated by the "voice of conscience." In listening, Dasein finds itself in a self-encounter. The voice of conscience is a calling that offers Dasein up to itself. Indeed, cloaked within this apparent self-calling-it is, after all, one's own conscience speaking-is a voice utterly SubStance #85, 1998 strange to oneself. Before approaching this strangeness, however, we need to heed Heidegger's saying that Dasein "wants to have a conscience"(314). Dasein is already a willing, attentive addressee who listens for a message to be received. The giving is not only the gift of Being but of Dasein as well. It is not that a voice of conscience reaches Dasein abruptly but that Dasein has always already waited for the calling. Dasein gives the ear to hear as well as listens to the voice of conscience, the gift from and of the other. This readiness to hear belongs to the resoluteness of Dasein who, in its decision to concede to Being, is always already expecting the appeal to be made:
The appeal calls back by calling forth: it calls Dasein forth to the possibility of taking over, in existing, even that thrown entity which it is; it calls Dasein back to its thrownness so as to understand this thrownness as the null basis which it has to take up into existence. This calling-back in which conscience calls forth, gives Dasein to understand that Dasein itself-the null basis for its null projection, standing in the possibility of its Being-is to bring itself back to itself from its lostness in the "they"; and this means that it is guilty. In considering guilt as not only the necessary but also the enabling condition of subjectivity, one needs to distinguish more precisely the contractual relation between subject and Being, between the one who readily anticipates to-be and that towards/in which this fulfillment is promised. How is this rapport not only non-relational-that is, suspended of absolute relationality-but also not to be transcended-that is, representing one's ownmost and contractual possibility? What does the subject turn to when s/he offers him/herself up to Being, transposed into a particular image, determination, or designation? Even taking into account Heidegger's reminder that this is only a transposition and thus the appropriation of Being by and in everydayness, I am provoked by the ambiguous reticence of Being that still gives and lends itself to Dasein, even in the latter's unauthentic existence.
Thirdly, how does this contractual relation, an always-already indebtedness, account for the fact that an interpellation is always without specificity, and even though the subject takes it as particularized to her/his being, the subject's recognition of that address is always a misrecognition? To articulate this question more carefully, we need to review briefly the resonances of misrecognition in at least two texts. Back at the scene of interpellation, Althusser specifies that the subject's recognition of him/herself in the address is always a misrecognition because it is the subject who takes him/herself as the addressee in response to the address. There is, therefore, no recognition other than misrecognition; every recognition is a misrecognition. This resonance harks back to the Lacanian corpus, in SubStance #85, 1998 which misrecognition constitutes the only possibility in which the subject can be, that is, infinitely misrecognized and enabled to continually desire.
My third question, then, is to understand the constitutiveness of the failure of misrecognition, of ever and repeatedly approaching plenitude without possessing it as fully realized. Put differently, my question has to do with the predicament of Dasein-which can no longer be thought as a predicament-to ever anticipate and be on the look-out for what gives it meaning, and indeed, from where that meaning is given.
Heidegger has said that the voice of conscience is not to be thought in an utterance. The call that calls Dasein back into itself is not to be taken as communication. The gift sent in such a calling is not a reassurance of one's attentiveness and proximity to Being, but an uncanniness that lets the sending reach for Dasein most openly. The giving itself, its very possibility and promise, is withheld in such a sending. But this concealment is not a coveting. Concealment is that reticence without which the gift of Being cannot be sent, without whose favor that sending cannot be under way. The promise itself remains to be read. In this last text under discussion, I wish to consider the constitutive failure or non-arrival of the subject's desire and fulfillment as that in which its promise is experienced with most certainty.
Austin: Pleasure in Failure
If Nietzsche has given the question of guilt to be thought as indebtedness, and if, for Heidegger, this indebtedness is further considered as a gift of Being, then Austin responds to both thinkers as the subject at once guided by the promise of plenitude and the consciousness of its impossibility. Austin's How to Do Things with Words performs a series of expulsions to free itself of infelicitous speech acts, which are susceptible to failure due to extenuating circumstances. Austin's project is well known; he sets out to distinguish performative from constative speech acts, only to confess that he is "floundering" amidst this series of collapses. He then moves on to determining utterances in terms of forces-locutionary, perlocutionary, and illocutionary-only to, again, admit to the futility of this task: "these formulas are at best very slippery tests" (131).
Despite these at best self-contradicting formulas, Austin continues to search for the decisive criteria upon which performative utterances can be determined in terms of force differentiation. What enables and generates his repeated efforts, it appears, lies in the very impossibility of carrying out SubStance #85, 1998 this project, a failure he recognizes: "the thing seems hopeless from the start" (67; my emphasis). One wonders if such a "hopeless" project could have had a "start" if it has been able to do nothing but engender its own continual failures. In fact, in spite of the title, Austin has told us anything but how to do things with words.
However, what cannot escape, and would even undermine, one's critique of Austin is the secret pleasure he so publicly enjoys in throwing his hands up in the air. In the proliferation of his failures to come up with a definitive set criteria for performative speech acts and to successfully distinguish the latter from constative speech acts, Austin, rather than becoming frustrated, is increasingly good-humored by the lack of prospects. With constantly thwarted new beginnings, he nonetheless begins again, with that very repetition as the only guarantee of the text. Bringing us "farther back" to "fundamentals," Austin seems unable to abandon the promise of the very possibility of a beginning. His own performative is always "unhappy," or "infelicitous," while doing anything but leaving him speechless. In fact, he always rushes to the fore, confessing rather loudly his failures. In a parenthetical note, he remarks, "I must explain again that we are floundering here. To feel the firm ground of prejudice slipping away is exhilarating, but brings its revenges" (61).
This curious passage, executed in humor, reveals a certain compulsion. Austin "must" relieve himself of this knowledge, and we may do well to ask whether the exhilaration he feels is inseparable from the price or guilt it incurs. While commenting on the futility or infelicity of the project, he nonetheless regenerates grounds for further explications. It is as though the text, while attempting to utter a performative speech act-the how of how to do things with words, obsesses on its own stammering. The problematic the text posits is no longer whether a speech act performs and how complete is its accomplishment, but, rather, the movement of failure itself and the pleasure it generates in sending itself back to itself, to its "fundamentals," to its "start." In other words, every time the project is declared to be futile, "hopeless from the start," or having "at best very slippery tests," Austin is able to regenerate new grounds for further research and speculation. The topic of discussion proliferates around his failure, and becomes a tireless inquiry into failure itself. It becomes more and more apparent that what Austin continues to sustain in the text is not the felicity of an utterance, but, rather, the infelicity of the utterance of the text-how to do things with words. The question is perhaps not the "words" but the "doing" itself, the ceaseless labor which gives itself up to perpetual futility but which, for that very reason, constitutes itself over and One could say that Austin is guilty of not living up to the promise given by the title of his book. In fact, Austin would be the first to point that out, as he so often does. In his acknowledgment of that failure, of that outstanding debt to the audience who patiently sits through his twelve lectures, Austin never fails, however, to persist as a philosopher. He never ceases to function as a desiring and enabled subject. He does not mind, perhaps, theorizing in the Nietzschean space of "a way, an interlude, a bridge" as a great promise.
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Conclusion
Subjectivity is an impossible order, which-however-is not to say that subjectification is undermined or discouraged by this impossibility. Althusser says that we are always already subjects, but that does not preclude the possibility that we are never the subjects we think we are. As one turns and embraces one's subjection in the hailing, one "gives" the possibility of its own fulfillment to an Other. But this giving exceeds the capacity of the Other to give as soon as it is particularized to a certain address. To be kept captive and attached to a certain identity is subject to a series of mediations, not the least of which is the subject's desire, proliferating itself around and necessarily exceeding particular objects or designations of desire. The guilty Nietzschean subject need not be incapacitated by bad conscience; in fact, a guilty subject like Austin regenerates his own affirmation in the pleasure of failure. When the It Gives determines Dasein in a sending/giving, Dasein also gives in turn, but in giving, Dasein gives "more" because Dasein does not know that s/he gives. In thinking that s/he still needs to have this desire granted, Dasein exceeds the capacity of the one who gives, because Dasein does not know that s/he "wants" from him/herself. The desire of the subject is always located elsewhere, exceeding any particular object or designation, because it is a promise itself, not to be transcended.4
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